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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
P. E. ASHTON COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
RUSSELL J. JOYNER , 
· Defendant and Third Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Respondent. 
IRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE 
NO. 26,367 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by third party plaintiff against the 
third party defendant, his insurance carrier. The plain-
tiff, appellant herein contends that his automobile insur-
ance covers certain damages to his automobile. The re-
2 
spondent contends that it does not by reason orf a certain 
exclusion rider attached to the policy. The appellant fur. 
tiler contends that, notwithstanding the exclusion provi-
sion, the respondent is liable to the appellant by reason 
of an accord. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court :f."irst held in favor of the appellant. A 
motion was made by the respondent for a new trial and 
to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law. The 
court granted the motion of the respondent in part and 
amended its findings, conclusions and judgment and found 
in favor orf the respondent. From this decision the appel-
lant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's judg-
ment and an order directing the lower court to enter judg-
ment in favor of the appllant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 18th day of November, 1961, the ap-
pellant purchased from the respondent collision insurance 
with a comprehensive insurance rider covering a 1958 
Dodge 34, ton truck and paid all premiums necessary to 
maintain the insurance for a period of one year from that 
date. This insurance policy is known as Policy No. ACR 
65992 of the United Pacific Insurance Group. (Tr. 35 and 
36) This policy (Exhibit 5, Tr. 35) carried a rider which 
contained the following language: 
"Driver Exclusion. It is agreed that no insurance 
is afforded the named insured, any other insured per-
son, organization, firm or corporation by or under any 
provision of the policy or of any endorsement attached 
tihe,reto or issued to form a part therof while any auto-
mobile covered by the policy is being operated, main-
tained or used by or under the control of any driver 
under the age of 25 other than Rosalee Joyner. All 
terms and conditions of the policy to which the en-
dorsement is attached, remain unchanged except as 
herein specifically provided." 
The policy further defines "insured" as follows: 
"Insured means: (a) with respect to the owned auto--
mobile, (1) the named insured and (2) if the named 
insured is an individual who owns a private passenger 
or utility automobile covered herein, any person or 
organization other than a person or organization en-
gaged in the automobile business or as a carrier or 
bailee for hire maintaining, using or having custody of 
the said automobile wi"!}h the permission of the named 
insured; (b) with respect to a non-owned automobile, if 
the named insured is an individual who owns a private 
passenger or utility automobile covered herein: (1) 
the named insured, and (2) any relative, provided the 
actual use thereof by either such named insured or 
relative is with the permission of the owner." (Ex-
hibit 5) 
In addition to the general coverage stated above, the 
insurance policy had Coverage ID, fire, transportation and 
theft, and Coverage E, comprehensive. The terms of the 
policy in this respect are as follows: 
"COVERAGE D-Fire, Transportation and Theft. 
To pay for loss to the owned automobile or if the named 
insured is an individual who owns a private passenger 
or utility automobile covered herein, to a non-owned 
automobile caused (a). by fire or lightning, (b) by 
smoke or smudge due to a sudden, unusual and faulty 
operation of any fixed heating equipment serving the 
premises in which the automobile is located, (c) by 
the stranding, sinking, burning, collision or derailment 
of any conveyance in or upon which the automoibile 
is being transported, or (d) by theft, larceny, robbery 
or pilfeTage. (Emphasis added) 
COVERAGE E-Comprehensive. 
To pay for loss caused other than by collision to rthe 
owned automobile or if the named insured is an indi-
vidual who owns a private passenger or utility auto ... 
mobile covered herein, to a non-owned automobile. 
For ·the purpose of this coverage, breakage of glass 
and lo.ss caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft, 
or larceny, explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, wa-
ter, flood, malicious mischief or vandalism, riot or civil 
commotion shall not be deemed to be loss caused by 
collision." (Emphasis added) 
Mr. Joyner did not know of the rider in the policy ex-
cluding drivers under the age of twenty-five years. (Tr. 
36) This rider was added by the agent and was never 
mentioned to the appellant prior to the accident. (Tr. 36) 
On or about September 10, 1962, the son of the ap-
pellant, Jimmy Joyner, was thirteen years of age and was 
in the company of one David Martin who was of the age 
of 15 years. (Tr. 34) On the day that the vehicle was 
taken, the appellant, Mr. Joyner, had left for Washington, 
D. C., and his wife had driven him to the airport in Salt 
µake. (Tr. 37) The keys to the truck were left in the 
house~ 
By stipulation of counsel the depositions of Jimmy 
Joyner, David Martin and Bobby Jorgenson were intro-
duced as part of the record in lieu of their actual testimony 
at trial. (Tr. 32) Reference to their depositions and page 
numbers will 1be as follows, respectively: Jimmy Joyner: 
J. J. p. ; David Martin, D. M. p. ; and Bobby 
Jorgenson, B. J. p. __ _ 
After his parents had gone, Jimmy, without permission, 
took the keys from the house and gave the keys to David 
Martin who backed the truck out of the driveway. The 
reason David Martin drove the truck out the driveway was 
that Jimmy did not know how to back it. David drove 
the truck with Jimmy as a passenger to Rodney Jorgen-
son's house. (D.M., p. 5) This was five or six blocks 
away. At Rodney's house, Jimmy became the driver and 
the three persons, Jimmy Joyner, David Martin and Rod-
ney Jorgenson took the truck on an unauthorized excur-
sion. All of the boys knew Jimmy Joyner did not have 
permi~ioo to take the truck. (J. J. p. 3, 4; D. M. p. 4; R. 
J. p. 8) 
They drove around Provo for some time and then 
drove toward the Provo boat harbor on Utah Lake. Jimmy 
was unable to control the truck and an accident ensued in 
which the truck was damaged to the extent of $1,121.44. 
The accident occurred at approximately 8:00 o'clock p. m. 
The important testimony concerning taking of the car was 
elicited from all three boys in their depositions, which dep-
ositions were substituted at the trial. The questions were 
asked by Mr. Berry, and the testimony is as follows:· 
6 
Deposttion of Jimmy Joyner, page 4: 
"Q Had you ever driven this 1958 Dodge % ton truck 
when your father was around prior to the accident? 
"A No I had not. 
"Q Where did you get the keys to the truck in order 
that y01.,1 _could operate it? 
"A I think in the house, we used to keep them in a 
little bowl in the house. I think I got them out of the in-
side of the bowl. We had to go in the house, I remembeT 
that. 
"Q At the time your parents were not in the house? 
"A No, they were on the way to Salt Lake. My dad 
had to go to Washington, D. C. and my mom was taking 
him to the airport. 
"Q In Salt Lake City? 
"A" Yes. 
"Q You took this truck to drive without the permis 
sion of your father? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Had you t?'Ver asked permission to drive his sedan? 
"A No. 
"Q Had your mother let you drive a car prior to the 
date of the accident? 
"A- No. 
"Q And were you the person who was driving the 
truck when the accident happened? 
"A Yah." 
Deposition of David Martin, page 4: 




"Q Do you know how he got the keys to the truck? 
"A They were either in the house or in the truck, I 
can't remember. 
"Q Did you or Jimmy ask anyone for their pennis-
siorn to use the truck? 
"A No, no one was home. 
"Q And do you happen to know where Jimmy's father, 
-where his parents were at that time. 
"A Yes. 
"Q Where? 
"A They were going to Salt Lake City. 
"Q I see, does Jimmy have any older brothers and 
sisters? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Where were they? 
"A I don't know, tlhey were not at home. 
"Q They were not at Jimmy's place? 
"A No. 
"Q What time of night did you take the truck? 
"A Seven or eight o'clock, I guess. After it got dark. 
"Q Do you know who drove the truck away from the 
premises? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Who was it? 
"A Me." 
Deposition of Rodney Jorgenson, page 8: 
"Q Did Jimmy on the day of this accident have any 
conversation with you about how he obtained the truck 
that he was driving? 
"A No, not conversation. I knew where he got it. 
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"Q Did you ask him if he had ·his fathe~"s or mother's 
permission to take the truck? 
"A No, I didn't need to. 
"Q Why didn't you need to ask him that? 
"A Because I knew his father would nort lert him take 
the truck." 
Mr. Joyner, the appellant, did not know his son could 
drive a vehicle. 
Another issue of fact is whether the respondent au-
thorized the repair of the_ vehicle and by so doring entered 
intq C!ll_ accord· and satisfaction with the appellant. There 
was a disputed issue as to whether the respondent directly 
negotiated with P. E. Ashton Company, the plaintiff herein, 
for the repair of the appellant's vehicle. Apparently, that 
matter was resolved in favor of the respondent and P. E. 
Ashton Company to the effect that P. E. Ashton Company 
negotiated directly with the appellant and that the third 
party defendant was absolved from liability to the plain-
tiff -by re~ of_ contract. 
Notwithstanding that finding, the evidence was to the 
effect that the respondent had authorized the appellant to 
get his truck repaired at P. E. Ashton Company and by so 
doing, had entered into an accord with the appellant. There 
was no evidence to the contrary. 
The truck was repaired by P. E. Ashton Company. 
The appellant believes ·the issues to ·be as hereinafter set 
forth under Points I and II. 
POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
TIIE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT 
THE APPELLANT WAS COVERED BY INSURANCE 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
POINT II 
TIIE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND AN 




TIIE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT 
THE APPELLANT WAS COVERED BY INSURANCE 
UNDER TIIE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
It is the contention of the appellant that Coverage D 
and Coverage E of his insurance policy most accurately fit 
the facts and circumstances of this case. The appellant 
has authority for coverage both under theft and compre-
hensive provisions. In either instance the appellant would 
be entitled to recover the entire amount of his damage 
without the $100.00 deduction provision of the general col-
lision coverage. 
It is further the contention of the appellant that the 
exclusion rider attached to the policy applies only to the 
voluntary letting of the car to a person under the age of 
25 years and has no application to an automobile involun-
tarily taken by a thief, a vandal, or mischievous child. If 
a contrary meaning were applicable, then the ,theft and 
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vandalism provisions of the policy would be of little or no 
effect and would offer little or no coverage, for presum-
ably, it would put upon the appellant the burden of prov-
ing that the theft or vandalism was caused by a person 
over the age of 25 years. We respectfully submit that this 
would be distorting the reasonable meaning of the policy. 
We shall take the issue up under the two categories 
named in the policy, to-wit: theft and comprehensive. 
(a) Theft. All of the cases that interpret the ex-
clusion clause for a driver under a particular age are cases 
involving situations where the parent or owner has volun-
tarily parted with the control of the car to a minor. In 
these cases, the Courts have determined that there is a 
lack of coverage because of the voluntary nature of the 
parting. In situations where there has been a question of 
whether there is an actual theft in light of the intent of 
the party to permanently deprive the owner of its custody, 
the Courts have concluded that this provision should be 
liberally construed so as to give the owner coverage in 
every case where the general language of the policy might 
reasonably apply to the fact situation. For example, in 
the case of Pennsylvania Indemnity Fire Corporation vs. 
Aldrich, 1941, 117 Fed 2nd, 774; 133 ALR, 914, the in-
sure<l's automobile was taken without authority by a boy 
employed by the insured to wash and simonize the car. 
The boy took several of his friends for a ride and upon 
his return accidentally wrecked the car about a mile and 
a half from the insured's home. The court instructed the 
jury that under a theft policy, because of the absence 
of the taker's intent criminally to deprive the owner of 
his property, it would permit the insurance company, by 
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using the word "theft", to evade liability in many cases in 
which, under prevailing laws, they would be liable if he 
word "larceny" had been used. Such a situation was de-
scribed as in conflict with general principles that an in-
surance policy is to be construed against the insurer and 
its terms are to be given the meaning which common speech 
imports. 
Another case is the case of Balmr v. Continental In-
surance Company (1942), 155 Kan. 26, 122 P.2d 710. 
Here a boy, without the knowledge or consent orf the in-
sured, took the car of the insured for a ride, picked up 
other boys and drove it around the area for a little while. 
He then allowed one of his friends to drive the car and 
the car was wrecked. The fact that the boy appropriated 
the car for his own personal use without the owner's con-
sent for as long as he saw fit was viewed as being a loss 
to the insured within the coverage of the policy notwith-
standing the boy did not intend to permanently deprive the 
owner of his property. 
The case of Toms v. Hartford Fire Insurance Com-
pany (1945) 146 Ohio State 39, 63 NE 2d 909, stated that 
theft is of a broader scope than larceny and comprehends 
essentially the wilful taldng or appropriation of one per-
son's property by another wrongfully and without justi-
fication and with the design to make use of such property 
in violation of the right of the owner. In this case, an 
employee of the insured, without authorization from the 
insured and over the protests of a co-employee, drove from 
the insured's garage and was involved in an accident where-
by the automobile was damaged. In this case the court 
determined that the insurance company was responsible 
for the loss. 
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Other cases to the same effect are Donges vs. Ameri-
can Auto and Fire Insurance Company, 97 NE 2d 108; 
Hoyne v. Buckeye Union Casualty Company, 69 NE 2d 
163. 
The appellant respectfully submits that the only rea-
sonable interipretation of the contract rider was that it 
was to apply to situations where the insured voluntarily 
let a person under the age of 25 years drive the vehicle 
in derogation of the terms of the policy. Any other inter-
pretation would be a distortion of the general intent of the 
parties and an injustice. 
(b) Comprehensive. There are a limited number 
of cases that interpret this type of a fact situation. Of 
the cases that have so considered the situation, perhaps 
the most analogous are the following: In the case of Un-
kelsbee v. Homestead Fire Insurance Company, 1945, Mu-
nicipal Court Appeals, District of Columbia, 41 Atlantic 
2nd, 168, the situation was that the plaintiff had parked 
his automobile facing downhill with the right front wheel 
turned at an angle against the curb, the handbrake on, 
the gears engaged, the ignition locked, and the keys thereto 
in the personal possession of the Plaintiff, and the car 
doors unlocked. Without the knowledge or consent of the 
plaintiff and in his absence, a 3% year oJd child entered 
the car, caused it to start down the hill, and attempted to 
steer it so that it proceeded across an intersection street 
and bus route and into the next block, a total distance of 
more than one city block, wherein it was stopped and dam-
aged by colliding with another automobile which was 
parked at the curb. The Court was of the opinion that 
the proximate cause of the loss was the act of vandalism 
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on the part of the child, that this came within the com-
prehensive coverage for theft or vaidalism and not within 
the provision excluding loss caused by collision. 
Another case of similar import is the case of Great 
American Insurance Company v. !Dedmon, 260 Ala. 30, 70 
Southern 2nd 421. This was an action against the insUT-
ance company brought under the automobile comprehen--
sive coverage including vandalism. It appeared that ithe 
automobile was upset by one having a past history of de-
mentia praecox. The Plaintiff had left his automobile 
parked in front of a hotel with the ignition locked and the 
key in his pocket. Sometime after 11:00 o'clock on the. 
night of July 13, 1952, the plaintiff's 20 year old soo, Larry 
Dedmon, came to the place where the car was parked and 
in some way started the engine and drove the car to the 
place where it was overturned and badly damaged. Larry 
Dedmon, the plaintiff's son, previously had been suffering 
from a mental disorder. The Court stated: 
"It is generally conceded that the collision clause in 
such policies, like all insurance contracts, should be 
construed most strongly against the insurer; this upon 
the sound basis of reason that the form of contract 
is made by him inrtended to the public." 
• • • 
"We do not feel that we should here construe the word 
vandalism in its narrowest sense, but hold that the 
proper construction should be such as is considered 
in the proper mind." 
Ln this case, the Court concluded that the act of Dedmon'~ 
son was an oot of vandalism and came within the purview 
of his policy. 
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The appellant believes that the cases generally sup-
port the conduct of the appeHant's son in this case to be 
an act of vandalism that would come within the compre-
hensive coverage provisions of the policy if it were not 
f oc 1the exclusion of drivers under the age of 25 years. 
Assuming that we have established the area in which 
the policy would apply we must then address ourselves to 
the question of the application of the exclusion provision. 
In this field there are few, if any, cases in point for rea-
son that most policies do not: carry such exiclusion provi-
sion and there has been very little litigation on the sub-
ject. As mentioned above, all of rthe cases ,that interpret 
this exclusion clause, so far as the appellant could discern, 
are cases wherein the insured has voluntarily parted with 
the possession of the car to a person within the age ex-
clusion. Even in these cases, the Courts have made a 
strenuous effort to impose liability on the insurance com-
pany wherever the facts could be interpreted to impose 
liability. Cases in support of this view are as follows: 
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, .APPT v. Habib 
Etoch, 174 Arkansas, 409; 295 SW, 376. In this case, the 
driver of a delivery truck took with him an 11 year old 
boy as a companion. At one time during the course of 
his deliveries he left the 11 year oJd boy in charge of the 
truck while he entered a building on business. A stranger 
had requested the boy to move the truck and the boy at-
tempted to move the truck in compliance with the request 
of the stranger and thereby damaged the truck. The pol-
icy carried an exclusion provision for persons operating 
the truck under the age oif 16 years. The Court, in inter-
preting the policy, had the following to say: 
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"The purpose in taking out the insurance was to pro-
vide indemnity against damages caused by the oper-
ation of the truck, of course, and since it was left 
standing temporarily by the regular driver, while he 
went into the hotel or barber shop to attend to some 
duties there, and since the boy who was requested. to 
watch the truck had no authority whatever .from him 
01" his employer to mo\re it, the owner of the truck 
is no more liable to the payment of damages caused 
by the unauthorized movement nor the insurance 
company any less liable to the payment of indemnity 
therefor than if the truck had been accidentally star-
ted by some other car bumping ~gainst it and the 
damage thereby caused; in other words, that within 
the meaning of the provisions of the policy the truck, 
while standing at the curb until the driver could dis-
charge the necessary duties inside the building, was 
being operated by him within the meaning of that 
clause in the policy." 
It is easily seen from the language of the Court that 
possession of the truck was not given to the boy ;for the 
purpose of driving it and that the boy had no pennission 
or authority to drive the truck. The key to the decision, 
therefore, was permission or authocity. 'J\his case is iden-
tical to the instant case from this standpoint. 
The Court has, in other cases, overcome the exclu-
sion provision of the contract for the benefit of the in-
sured. Those cases are Bailey v. USF & G Company, 185 
SC 169; 193 SC 638; Raptis v. USF&G, West Vir-
guua , 156 SE 53; Johnson v. Travelers Insurance 
Company, 147 Oregon 345, 32 P2d 587. 
The purpose of exclusion clauses are to reduce the 
cost of coverage in situations where the insured agrees not 
lti 
to let persons under specific ages drive the vehicle. The 
entire tenor of this agreement is based upon the volun-
tary letting of the vehicle to drivers of a youthful age. 
Th.is is because statistics have proven that the chances of 
accident are greater in the case of youthful drivers. The 
provision was never intended to apply to cases oftheft and 
comprehensive damage. In this situation, the owner has 
no control over the act orf vandalism, malicious mischief 
or theft of a minor or juvenile. The purpose of these ex-
clusion provisions is set forth in 5 Am. Jur., 33, Sec. 31. 
In this treatise nowhere is there any suggestion that the 
exclusion provision is to apply to theft or comprehensive 
coverage or situations beyond the control of the insured. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND AN 
ACCORD BETWEEN THE APPELLANT AND RE-
SPONDENT. 
The appellant herein contends that Finding of Fact 
No. 5 of the Court's amended Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law is wholly in derogation of the facts proven. 
It is the opinion of the appellant that the admissions of 
the respondent's agents show conclusively an accord and 
that under the circumstances therein the appellant would 
be en,titled to judgment by this reason alone. 
The appellant called one Donald Kind (Tr. 50) who 
testified that he was a claim adjuster for the United Pa-
cific Insurance Company on September 10, 1962. He tes-
tified that he had authority to settle the claim orf Mr. Joyn-
er's, the appellant herein, and that it had been assigned to 
him to handle. 
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Mr. Kind admitted, (Tr. 52) that at the time he wrote 
a letter, Exhibit 7, that he believed the insurance company 
would pay the bill charged by the Plaintiff, P. E. Ashton 
Company. They, in that letter, stated that they had re-
c·2ived the final billing from P. E. Ashton Company and 
asked him to sign the release. This, the appellant takes 
to be an accord concerning the issue of liability. Mr. 
Joyner did not sign the rele·ase because the release was 
for collision coverage in the amount of $1,013.49 and not 
in the amount of $1,121.47 whlch would be the amount 
of his coverage under comprehensive. (Tr. 43) He so 
advised Mr. Kind. 
Mr. Kind testified that it was not until he had received 
a copy of Mr. Berry's letter orf February 11, 1963, (De-
fendant's Exhibit 8) that he had any reason to believe 
that the claim of the appellant would not be paid. (Tr. 52) 
It should be noted as a matter of admitted fact that 
Raymond M. Berry, the attorney for the appellant, is also 
the local claims manager for the appellant. Up until the 
time of Mr. Berry's letter, both Mr. Kind, the adjuster for 
the company, and Mr. Joyner felt that there was an agree-
ment as to liability and the issue is one of whether it was 
covered by the collision aspects of the policy or the com-
prehensive aspects of the policy. 
Mr. Joyner testified that he had conversations with 
Mr. Albert Bowen who was the sales agent for the com-
pany and through whom the company dealt from time to 
time in conveying messages to Mr. Joyner. Mr. Bowen's 
insurance agency was at Pleasant Grove, Utah. (Tr. 53) 
Mr. Joyner testified that Mr. Bowen had told him in Sep-
tembcT of 1962. shortly after the accident, to have the 
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truck repaired and for him to take it to P. E. Ashton 
Company. Mr. Joyner testified that he assumed that Mr. 
Albert Bowen had authorized P. E. Ashton Company to 
repair the truck. T'he testimony is undisputed that P. E. 
Ashton Company sent the bill to the respondent when t!he 
truck was repaired as a result in information that was 
given to it by someone other than the appellant. (Tr. 
24 and 25) In this ·respect, Mr. Neil Kershner, P. E. Ash-
ton's foreman, said that the information concerning the 
billing and where it was to be sent was given to him or 
to his company by Mr. Don Kind, the insurance adjuster. 
(Tr. 25) In any event, Mr. Kershner, Mr. Joyner, Mr. 
Kind, and Mr. Bowen all admit contact with P. E. Ashton 
Company concerning the repair of the truck. 
Mr. Bowen, the agent of the respondent company, tes-
tified that before the truck was repaired, he had a tele-
phone conversation with Mr. Kind concerning the repair 
of Mr. Jo~er's truck and that the conversation was in 
substance as follows: (Tr. 56) 
"Q Will you tell us in substance the conversation? 
"A Well, all I can remember, asked me if it was all 
right for me to go ahead and start the repairs and indi-
cated it was. 
"Q Start the repairs on the truck? 
"A Yes. 
"Q He told you that it was, is that correct? 
"A To the best of my knowledge it's correct. 
"Q What did you do as a result of this conversation? 
By that, I am asking did you call P. E. Ashton Company 
and tell them? 
"A I can't remember for sure. I know I told Russ 
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it was all right to go ahead, though. I can't remember if 
I called P. E. Ashtons or not. 
"Q But you did inform Mr. Joyner it was all right to 
get the truck repaired? 
"A Yes." 
On cross-examination Mr. Bowen testified as follows 
in response to questions asked him by Mr. Berry: (Tr. 57) 
"Q The phone conversation you are refevring to was 
with Mr. Kind in Salt Lake from your ofiice in Pleasant 
Grove? 
"A Yes. 
"Q That was along in September right after the ac-
cident? 
"A It would have been soon after, because the rea-
son I made the phone call and the reason I wanted to get 
something done on it was because Mr. Joyner wanted to 
get the truck fixed to take hunting if he possibly could. 
"Q Did you find out if an appraisal had been made on 
the vehicle? Actually isn't that what-
Mr. Howard: Just a minute. You asked him a 
question. Let him answer if he can. 
"A Would you state that again? 
"Q (By Mr. Berry) Did you find Mr. Kind and find 
out if there had been an appraisal made on the truck? 
"A No, I can't remember." 
The respondent did not introduce any evidence con-
trary to the testimony of Joyner, Kind and Bowen to the 
effect that the respondent admitted liability and would 
have the truck repaired, except the letter of Mr. Berry 
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dated February 11, 1963, Defendant's E~hibit 8. The 
truck was repaired in September and October of 1962, and 
delivered to the appellant in October of 1962. The appel-
lant believes that the record is absolutely devoid of any 
evidence to refute an accord. The law in respect to what 
is an accord is rather fundamental, and, therefore, the 
appellant cites to the Court text material for definition 
purposes only. The substance of the material is that an 
accord is an agreement for giving and ta~ing a thing in 
satisfaction of an existing debt or claim. The satisfaction 
is the actual giving and taking of such thing. 1 Am. Jur. 
215, Sec. 1, Re-statement of the Law of Contracts, Sec. 417, 
Corbin on Contracts, page 1041, Sec. 1276. 
Under the law, the appellant believes that an accord 
was established when the respondent agreed to repair the 
vehicle of the appellant and the only issue was whether the 
coverage would be under the collision provisions m the 
policy or the comprehensive provision of the policy. All 
other disputes were resolved by this agreement. The ap-
pellant relied upon the agreement, delivered his car to the 
plaintiff for repair, incurred obligations of $1,121.44, and 
is entitled to satisfaction from the respondent in this 
amount. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully requests that the Court re-
verse the judgment of the trial court and order that judg-
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